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WE THE EXCEPTIONAL
AMERICAN PEOPLE
James E. Fleming*
[The People of America] reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe.
The FederalistNo. 141

I. INTRODUCTION: "AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM"
There is an academic movement afoot-one with a long historical pedigree-to attribute the vitality of the American constitutional order to "American exceptionalism." The most
prominent representative of this school of thought is Bruce Ackerman, whose We the People opens with a jeremiad against the
"Europeanization" of American constitutional theory and urges
us as Americans to "look inward" to rediscover our distinctive
patterns, practices, and ideals.2 He maps the terrain of theory as
being divided into monists ("Anglophiles"), rights foundationalists ("Germanophiles"), and dualists (red-blooded Americans).3
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985, Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri. I am grateful to

Akhil Amar, Sot Barber, Debby Denno, Chris Eisgruber, John Finn, Martin Flaherty,
Ned Foley, Samuel Freeman, Will Harris, Bob Kaczorowski, Greg Keating, Sandy Levinson, Steve Macedo, Linda McClain, Walter Murphy, John Rawis, Paul Schwartz, Tony
Sebok, and Bill Treanor for helpful comments concerning this Article. I also would like
to thank my research assistants Larry McCabe, Steven Shaw, and Sabrena Silver. Fordham University School of Law provided generous research support. I prepared an earlier
version of this Article for the Georgetown University Law Center Discussion Group on
Constitutional Law, December 4-5, 1993, which was organized by Mark Tushnet.
1. The FederalistNo. 14, at 104 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New American Library, 1961).
2. Bruce Ackerman, We the People:Foundations3-6, 32-33 (Belknap Press, 1991)
("We the People").
3. Id. at 6-16, 32-33, 35-36. Monism emphasizes popular sovereignty over and
against fundamental rights, and thus tends to equate popular sovereignty with parliamentary supremacy on a British model. Id. at 7-10,35. Rights foundationalism challenges the
primacy of popular sovereignty, stressing constraints imposed by deeper commitments to
fundamental rights on a German model. Id. at 10-12,35-36. Ackerman presents dualism
as an "accommodation" between monism and rights foundationalism. Id. at 12-13. Dualism distinguishes between the constituent power of We the People, expressed in the
higher law of the Constitution, and the ordinary power of officers of government, ex-
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Only dualists have the "strength" to declare our American independence from British and German models and philosophers.4
Thus, as Sanford Levinson observes, Ackerman is reopening the
question about "American exceptionalism" from Europe.5
Ackerman published We the People in 1991, during the bicentennial celebration of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
Accordingly, it is tempting to dismiss his rhetoric of American
exceptionalism as little more than patriotic flag-waving. But his
argument that the American Constitution is dualist rather than
rights foundationalist depends importantly upon a contrast that
he draws between the American Constitution and the German
Basic Law with respect to entrenchment of constitutional provi-

sions against subsequent amendment.6 I shall assess this argupressed in the ordinary law of legislation. Dualism preserves, against encroachment by
ordinary law, the fundamental rights ordained and established by We the People in the
higher law of the Constitution; to that extent, it is like rights foundationalism. But it
preserves only those fundamental rights; beyond them, it is like monism in deferring to
ordinary law. Id. at 12-13, 32-33.
There are problems with Ackerman's map of the terrain of American constitutional
theory. For purposes of this Article, I shall put to one side the difficulties with his distinction between monism and dualism, and I shall accept his distinction between dualism and
rights foundationalism. Elsewhere, I have suggested that one can be a dualist in a general
sense without being committed to dualism in Ackerman's specific sense-that is, without
endorsing his complex apparatus of higher lawmaking through structural amendments to
the Constitution outside the formal Article V amending procedures, and without accepting his purported distinction between dualism and rights foundationalism on the
ground that the former theory but not the latter rejects the idea that a duly ratified
amendment might be unconstitutional. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 287 n.380, 290 n.405 (1993). Furthermore, I have
outlined a constitutional constructivism, id. at 217-20, 280-304, a theory that is neither as
positivist as Ackerman's own theory of dualism nor as naturalist as his portrayal of rights
foundationalism.
4. Ackerman, We the People at 3 (cited in note 2).
5. Sanford Levinson, blurb on dust jacket of We the People. See also Sanford Levinson, Accounting for ConstitutionalChange, 8 Const. Comm. 409, 429 (1991) (characterizing Ackerman's enterprise as "the most important and imaginative work now being
done in the area of constitutional theory"). If Ackerman's We the People reopens the
tradition of "American exceptionalism," perhaps his The Future of Liberal Revolution
continues the tradition of American imperialism, attempting to colonize Eastern European countries (not to mention South Africa and Latin American countries) with American models and theories. See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale
U. Press, 1992). Both works are thus in different ways characteristically American. Ackerman places himself in the tradition of American exceptionalism epitomized by Louis
Hartz, stating: "I share with Louis Hartz an abiding skepticism about the power of European models to enlighten American politics without fundamental conceptual reorganization." Ackerman, We the People at 25 (cited in note 2) (referring to Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace, 1955)).
6. Ackerman, We the People at 13-16 (cited in note 2). Ackerman also discusses
the German Basic Law in his treatment of liberal revolution. See Ackerman, The Future
of Liberal Revolution at 101-12 (cited in note 5). In the aftermath of the unification of
West Germany and East Germany, I shall speak simply of the "German Basic Law." For
an analysis applying Ackerman's constitutional theory to constitutional issues raised by
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ment, asking to what extent his contrast illuminates differences
between the American and German constitutional orders and adjudicates the conflicting claims of dualism and rights foundationalism to be the better account of the American scheme of
government. My conclusion is that, although the American

"fabrics of governments" may well be exceptional, Ackerman
has not established his case for dualism over rights
foundationalism.
II. OUR ALIENABLE DUALIST CONSTITUTION?
Ackerman argues that the American Constitution is dualist
rather than rights foundationalist. Dualists conceive the Constitution as "democratic first, rights-protecting second" in the sense
that judicial protection of constitutional rights against encroachments by the ordinary law of legislation "depend[s] on a prior
democratic affirmation on the higher lawmaking track" of the
Constitution.7 Rights foundationalists "reverse this priority," for
they hold that "the Constitution is first concerned with protecting
rights; only then does it authorize the People to work their will
on other matters."8
German unification, see Paul Schwartz, Social Discourse and ConstitutionalChange: The
Example of German Reunification (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
7. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). Thus, Ackerman's theory of
dualism seeks to reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review, put
forward in The FederalistNo. 78 at 467, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1), and
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803): Courts are obligated to interpret the higher law of the Constitution and to preserve it against encroachments by the
ordinary law of legislation. See Ackerman, We the People at 60-61, 72 (cited in note 2).
In this Article, I shall not assess his distinctions between ordinary lawmaking and higher
lawmaking, or between "normal politics" on the former track and "constitutional politics"
on the latter track. Id. at 230-94. For discussions of these matters, see, e.g., Suzanna
Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past,105 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992) (reviewing Ackerman,
We the People (cited in note 2)); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of
Ackerman's We the People, 9 Const. Comm. 309 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, The
Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, 11 Const. Comm. 115 (1994). See also Symposium on
Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 Ethics 446 (1994).
8. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2). For an argument that Ackerman's formulation presents a "false dichotomy" because both democracy and rights, or
popular sovereignty and unalienable rights, are constitutive principles of our constitutional democracy, see Samuel Freeman, OriginalMeaning,DemocraticInterpretation,and
the Constitution,21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 41-42 (1992). For a similar argument, though not
directed specifically against Ackerman, that our constitutional order is a hybrid scheme of
democracy (majority rule) and constitutionalism (limited government), or constitutional
democracy, see, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and William F. Harris II,
American ConstitutionalInterpretation23-46 (Foundation Press, 1986); Walter F. Murphy,
Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy,in Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitionsin the Contemporary World 3, 3-7 (Oxford U.
Press, 1993) ("Constitutions, Constitutionalism,and Democracy").
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Ackerman's argument for dualism over rights foundationalism emphasizes a contrast between the American Constitution
and the German Basic Law concerning entrenchment. Our Constitution, he observes, "has never (with two exceptions...) explicitly entrenched existing higher law against subsequent
amendment by the People."9 The two exceptions are Article V's
prohibition of amendments (1) affecting the African slave trade
until 1808 and (2) depriving a state of equal representation in the
Senate without its consent. The Basic Law, by contrast, "explicitly declared that a long list of fundamental human rights cannot
constitutionally be revised, regardless of the extent to which a
majority of Germans support repeal."1o Article 79(3) entrenched
unalienable human rights to dignity, the fundamental principles
of free democratic basic order, and the basic structure of
federalism."1
Ackerman submits that practices regarding entrenchment
provide an important crucible for testing whether a constitutional
order is dualist or rights foundationalist.12 He contends that the
absence of "German-style entrenchment" of fundamental rights
in the American Constitution-and thus their repealability or
alienability-is an "embarrassment" for rights foundationalists
but not for dualists.13 He also states that our constitutional experience with entrenchment, through the two exceptions involving
slavery and federalism, has been "very negative" and has not
9. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2).
10. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
11. Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law provides in relevant part: "Amendments
of this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Laender, the participation
on principle of the Laender in legislation, or the basic principles laid down in Articles 1
and 20, shall be inadmissible." Articles 1 and 20 relate to the protection of unalienable
human rights to dignity and the free democratic basic order, specifically, the right to resist
any person or persons seeking to abolish the constitutional order, a democratic and social
federal state. For a translation of portions of The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, see Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus eds., Comparative Constitutional
Law: Cases and Commentaries (St. Martin's Press, 1977) ("Comparative Constitutional
Law"). For analyses of the constitutional theory of the Basic Law, and of its entrenchment of certain basic principles against subsequent amendment, see, e.g., John E. Finn,
Constitutions in Crisis: PoliticalViolence and the Rule of Law 185-91 (Oxford U. Press,
1991) ("Constitutionsin Crisis"); Donald P. Kommers, The ConstitutionalJurisprudence
of the FederalRepublic of Germany 36-39, 52-55 (Duke U. Press, 1989); Walter F. Murphy, Excluding PoliticalParties: Problemsfor Democraticand ConstitutionalTheory, in
Paul Kirchhof and Donald P. Kommers eds., Germany and Its Basic Law 173, 173-78
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993) ("Excluding Political Parties").
12. Ackerman, We the People at 13 (cited in note 2).
13. Id. at 14. See also Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw,
99 Yale L.J. 453, 469 (1989) (using the stronger formulation "a very great
embarrassment").
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served the cause of human freedom.14 From these aspects of our
constitutional document and history, he concludes that rights
foundationalism "is inconsistent with the existing premises of the
American higher lawmaking system."15 For in America, "it is the
People who are the source of rights,"16 and We the People are
not bound by a higher law than the higher law of the Constitution.17 In the crucible of entrenchment, Ackerman argues, ours
proves to be an alienable dualist Constitution, unlike the unalienable rights foundationalist Basic Law.
Should we be persuaded by Ackerman's argument for dualism from his contrast between the American Constitution and
the German Basic Law? Are practices of entrenchment a good
crucible in which to test the basic commitments of a constitutional order? Or is Ackerman's test rigged in favor of a positivist
dualism?
Early British legal positivists like John Austin believed that,
to get to the bottom of a legal system, one had to find a sovereign, "a legally untrammelled will" behind the legislature that
was free, "not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but
also from its own prior legislation."18 Sophisticated contemporary positivists like H.L.A. Hart have argued instead that the
foundation of a legal system is an accepted rule of recognition
specifying the ultimate criteria of legal validity.19 Ackerman has
stated that his aim in constitutional theory is to develop a "principled positivism" in the form of a theory of dualist democracy
that would provide "principles of recognition" of higher lawmaking (by analogy to Hart's idea of rules of recognition).2o Under
14. Ackerman, We the People at 15 (cited in note 2) (referring to entrenchment of
African slave trade until 1808). See also id. at 326 n.21 (referring to entrenchment of
equal representation of each state in the Senate and claiming that "[Ihis effort to entrench federalism caused all sorts of trouble in the aftermath of the Civil War").
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id.
17. In using formulations like that in the text ("We the People are not bound by a
higher law") or in the title ("We the Exceptional American People"), I do not intend to
personify the constituent power, that is, to conflate the citizenry (the people) with the
constituent power (We the People). For a sophisticated treatment of the difference between the "Constitutional People" and the "sovereign constitution-making people," see
William F. Harris, II, The Interpretable Constitution 201-04 (Johns Hopkins U. Press,
1993).
18. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 145 (Clarendon Press, 1961) (analyzing John
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (H.L.A. Hart ed., Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1954) (1832)). See also id. at 70-76 (analyzing the positivist idea of "The Sovereign behind the Legislature").
19. Id. at 97-107.
20. Bruce Ackerman, Remarks at New York University School of Law Colloquium
on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman and Ronald
Dworkin).
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Ackerman's positivist theory of popular sovereignty, We the People are free, not only from limitations imposed ab extra by
unalienable rights, but also from our own prior higher
lawmaking.21
With this background in mind, we should ask whether the
fact that our Constitution lacks entrenchment clauses of the sort
expressed in the German Basic Law proves, as Ackerman maintains, that it is dualist rather than rights foundationalist. In answering this question, we should consider the strong likelihood
that an unrelenting positivist dualist applying Ackerman's crucible of entrenchment would contend that the German Basic Law,
like the American Constitution, is ultimately dualist. According
to such a positivist, Article 79(3) of the Basic Law would not, in
Hart's terms, put a stop to the chain of inquiries concerning legal
validity;22 she or he would insist on pressing further to find the
legally untrammelled will or sovereign standing behind the entrenchment clauses. (The proof of this speculation lies in Ackerman's suggestion that the Basic Law may have an "escape hatch"
(Article 146) through which German dualists might prevail over
German rights foundationalists by repealing the limitations of
Article 79(3) and thereby modifying the Basic Law's foundationalist commitments.23) From the standpoint of such a positivist
dualism, entrenchment clauses in a written constitution are-to
quote Chief Justice John Marshall from an analogous context"absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in
its own nature illimitable."24
21. Ackerman, We the People at 13-16 (cited in note 2).
22. See Hart, The Concept of Law at 104 (cited in note 18).

23. Ackerman, We the People at 326 n.20 (cited in note 2). Ackerman observes that
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), in Article 146, allows for its replacement by a completely
new Constitution (Verfassung). Id. He writes: "Since the drafters of the Basic Law took
this step to emphasize the provisional character of West Germany [pending reunification
with East Germany], and not the provisional character of fundamental rights, it would be
a great abuse of art. 146 to use the occasion of a new Verfassung to modify the entrenched
provisions on human rights." Id. He concludes: "Nonetheless, this technical possibility
does provide an escape hatch through which German dualists might conceivably modify
their Basic Law's foundationalist commitments." Id.
Originally, Article 146 provided: "This Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the

day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into
force." Murphy and Tanenhaus, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw at 22-23 (cited in note
11). As it turned out, the Basic Law was not replaced by a completely new Constitution
during the process of reunification of West Germany and East Germany. For constitutional analyses of German reunification, see Peter E. Quint, The ConstitutionalLaw of
German Unification, 50 Md. L. Rev. 475 (1991); Schwartz, Social Discourse and Constitutional Change: The Example of German Reunification (cited in note 6).

24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In the quoted passage,
Chief Justice Marshall is not discussing entrenchment clauses, but instead is advancing the
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Furthermore, even a rights foundationalist could admit, as

John Rawls writes, that "in the long run a strong majority of the
electorate can eventually make the constitution conform to its

political will."25 But, Rawls continues: "This is simply a fact
about political power as such. There is no way around this fact,

not even by entrenchment clauses that try to fix permanently the

basic democratic guarantees."2 6 This fact about political power,

however, is not the foundation of legitimacy in either the American or the German constitutional order.27 Nor does it prove that,

at bottom, our Constitution is dualist rather than rights foundationalist. Ackerman's crucible of entrenchment is a rigged positivist test.
If practices of entrenchment do not tell us whether we have

a dualist or a rights foundationalist constitutional order, can they
tell us anything? One way to explore this matter is to ask what
the purposes of entrenchment are. Let us posit a positivist-less
relentless than the one we just imagined-who believes that if
you want to know the constitutive principles on which a constitutional order is founded (and nothing else), you must look at it as
an entrenchment formalist, and examine what provisions are explicitly entrenched in the constitutional document against subsequent amendment.28 Applying this test, the positivist would
conclude from Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law that the
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review under a written constitution. See
supra note 7.
25. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 233 (Colum. U. Press, 1993).
26. Id. See also Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of ConstitutionalValues, 53 S.Cal.
L. Rev. 703, 757 (1980) (conceding that "[a]s a matter of sheer power, the people can give
themselves a new constitutional order" by repudiating a constitutional document's protection of unalienable human rights to dignity, but contending that the terms of the current constitutional document "cannot supply legitimate procedures" for destroying the
old constitutional order and creating a new one); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory:
The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in Sanford Levinson ed.,
Responding to Imperfection (Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 1995) ("Merlin's Memory")
(discussing the issue of the extent to which "the people can bind themselves").
27. I do not mean to deny that one could attempt to provide a justification for a
constitutional theory of popular sovereignty or positivist dualism like Ackerman's on the
basis of a normative political theory. Ackerman, however, has not elaborated such foundations for his constitutional theory, notwithstanding his title (We the People: Foundations). Indeed, Ackerman has stated-in terms of Ronald Dworkin's formulation of the
two dimensions of best interpretation, fit and justification, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire 239 (Belknap Press, 1986); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 107 (Harv.
U. Press, 1977)-that "fit is everything." Remarks at New York University School of
Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993 (colloquy between Ackerman
and Dworkin). For suggestions that Ackerman's theory at bottom is a form of authoritarianism or formalism, see infra note 59.
28. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167,
171 (Peter Smith, 1952) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge

362

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:355

constitutive principles of the German scheme of government
were unalienable human rights to dignity, the fundamental principles of free democratic basic order, and the basic structure of
federalism. But such a positivist would find Article V of the
American Constitution cryptic (or deeply unjust) on first sight:
for entrenchment of protection of the African slave trade until
1808 and equal representation of the states in the Senate hardly
look like constitutive principles of a constitutional order.29 This
discovery might lead to either of two conclusions: that the American Constitution simply recognizes no fundamental rights as
constitutive principles, or that in our constitutional document entrenchment performs a role other than that of securing constitutive principles. Ackerman basically draws the former conclusion;
I shall pursue the latter.
What alternative role might Article V entrenchment play in
the American Constitution? Perhaps Article V entrenches provisions that reflect deep compromises with our Consitution's constitutive principles: the protection of the African slave trade with
the principle that all persons are created equal, and the equal
representation of the states in the Senate with the principle of the
equal representation of citizens.30 The founders of the Constitution concluded that both compromises were necessary to "the
forging of the Union": the slave states insisted upon the former,
the small states upon the latter.31 Thus, both imperfections were
considered necessary "to form a more perfect Union" than the
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience").
29. On one interpretation, which I offer below, these provisos in Article V entrenched compromises with our constitutive principles. See infra text accompanying
notes 30-33. On another interpretation, which underscores the injustice of the original
Constitution, these provisos entrenched two of our constitutive principles: the fundamental right of slave holders to property in slaves and structural protections of states' rights.
John Finn suggested the latter interpretation to me (without endorsing it).
30. For a suggestion that both the protection of slavery in the original Constitution
and the provision for equal representation of each state in the Senate-the two matters
that Article V entrenched against amendment-are inconsistent with the principles of
"democratic reason" or "constitutional democracy," see Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at
35 (cited in note 8).
31. See Richard B. Morris, The Forgingof the Union: 1781-1789, at 281-87 (Harper
& Row, 1987). See also Richard B. Bernstein (with Jerome Agel), Amending America: If
We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 20-22 (Times
Books, 1993). Akhil Amar has observed that Article V's proviso regarding the equal representation of states in the Senate was not itself part of the famous "Connecticut Compromise" between the small and large states, noting that the proviso "was not even
mentioned until the penultimate day of the convention, and was voted on with virtually
no discussion or analysis of its implications." Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1070-71 n.97

(1988).
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Articles of Confederation. From this standpoint, contra Ackerman, we can see that Article V entrenched features of the Constitution that were vulnerable to being repealed through
democratic procedures, precisely because they manifested such
deep compromises with our constitutive principles and ordained
such an imperfect Constitution.
With this idea of the purpose of entrenchment on hand, we
should reassess Ackerman's contrast between American and
German practices. Ackerman may make such haste to disparage
the American experience with "German-style entrenchment,"
and to taint it by association with slavery, that he overlooks this
alternative purpose of bolstering vulnerable features of a scheme
of government. Moreover, his discussion obscures a deeper similarity: both the American and German founders expressly entrenched provisions of their new constitutional orders that they
considered necessary to secure the transition to a more perfect
union. Again, in making the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, the small states insisted upon
equal representation in the Senate, and the slave states upon protection of the African slave trade. In the aftermath of the failures of the Weimar Constitution and the atrocities of Nazism, the
founders of the Federal Republic of Germany insisted upon entrenching certain unalienable human rights and structural principles that had been outrageously disregarded during the Nazi
regime.32
The further point is that both countries expressly entrenched
the features of their new constitutional orders that were feared to
be in greatest need of bolstering, and at greatest risk of repeal
through democratic procedures, given their historical circumstances. As it happens, the American Constitution explicitly entrenched provisions that deeply compromised its founding
principles, while the German Basic Law explicitly entrenched
provisions that profoundly expressed its reconstruction principles.33 We should not, however, let this contrast concerning en32. See, e.g., Fin, Constitutionsin Crisisat 179-93 (cited in note 11); Kommers, The
ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the FederalRepublic of Germany at 36-39, 52-55 (cited in

note 11).
33. Ackerman might concede this point yet still contend that it cuts in favor of dualism that the American founders did not entrench unalienable rights. One response is that

they did, for example, in the Preamble, the First Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, the
Declaration of Independence, and the structural implications of the constitutional order.
See, e.g., Harris, The InterpretableConstitution at 164-68, 191-201 (cited in note 17) (analyzing "the limits of textual amendability" and "a hierarchy of amendment sequences"
that distinguishes between the limits on amendability through Article V and the greater
revisability of the polity through Article VII); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
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trenchment clauses obscure similarities between the constitutive
principles of the two constitutional orders.
In drawing this misleadingly strong contrast between the
American and German constitutional schemes, and urging
Americans to "look inward" to rediscover their distinctive dualist
Constitution, does Ackerman seriously mean to imply that the
idea of unalienable rights is alien to American constitutional theory, or that Americans have gotten this idea from looking outward to German models and philosophers? To the contrary, the
idea of unalienable rights is far more congenial to the American
constitutional tradition than to the German. For one thing, British legal positivists from Bentham to Hart have characterized
American jurisprudence as marked by an anti-positivist emphasis
on unalienable rights.34 For another, the German Basic Law's
explicit entrenchment of unalienable rights was a "forceful rejecGoverned ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 504-05
(1994) (emphasizing the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble, and the logic of a
system of republican self-government in suggesting that "not everything is properly
amendable," for certain higher law principles, including popular sovereignty and perhaps
liberty of conscience, frame Article V itself); Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1044-45 n.1
(cited in note 31) (arguing that "the First Amendment may itself be a seemingly paradoxical exception to the general rule that amendments must not be unamendable"); Walter F.
Murphy, The Art of ConstitutionalInterpretation:A PreliminaryShowing, in M. Judd Harmon ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States 130, 150-51 (Kennikat Press,
1978) (suggesting that the First Amendment may be an "unamendable constitutional provision"); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the FlagBurningAmendment Unconstitutional?,100 Yale
LJ.1073, 1084-89 (1991) (arguing that there are natural rights limitations on the amending power, derived from the history and structure of the Constitution as a whole, that are
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment). Below, I
shall raise the possibility of a theory of implicit or "structural entrenchments" of fundamental rights as distinguished from explicit entrenchments of them in Article V. See infra
text accompanying notes 66-73.
Another response is that the American founders did not need explicitly to entrench
unalienable rights. See, e.g., Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. at 41 (cited in note 8). Here, I
shall emphasize the latter response. It is well to recall that the original Constitution did
not include a Bill of Rights, much less an entrenched one. As Hamilton wrote in The
FederalistNo. 84, "the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." The FederalistNo. 84 at 515 (Alexander Hamilton)
(cited in note 1). The arguments in favor of adopting a Bill of Rights ultimately prevailed,
but against this background perhaps it would have been too much to ask for an entrenched Bill of Rights. Moreover, in the historical circumstances surrounding the American founding, as contrasted with those surrounding the German reconstruction, explicit
entrenchment of unalienable rights would have been unnecessary.
34. See H.L.A. Hart, 1776-1976: Law in the Perspective of Philosophy, in H.L.A.
Hart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy 145, 145-52 (Clarendon Press, 1983) (discussing Bentham's famous attack on the Declaration of Independence); H.L.A. Hart, The
United States of America, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 53,53-65 (Clarendon Press,
1982) (same); see also H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudencethrough English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy
123, 123-25, 132-42, supra (discussing American jurisprudence's anti-positivist concentration on rights and moral principles in the judicial decisionmaking process).
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tion of the legal positivism that grounded individual liberties in
Weimar, where such rights found their source in the authority of
the state."35

The reconstruction of constitutional democracy in Germany,
upon "reflection and choice,"36 was rooted not only in a rejection

of Weimar constitutional theory and Nazism, but also in an acceptance of American constitutional theory and practice. After

World War II, the American "fabrics of governments" served as
a "model on the face of the globe."37 The German Basic Law

(not to mention the Japanese Constitution) was in no small measure made in America.38 To some extent, therefore, when Americans look outward to the German Basic Law, they look into a
mirror of their own unalienable rights and constitutive principles.
In other words, to a degree the unwritten American Constitution
is written into the German Basic Law, and the unalienable rights
and constitutive principles underlying the American constitutional order are expressly entrenched in the German constitutional document.39
35. Finn, Constitutionsin Crisis at 188 (cited in note 11). See also Kommers, The
ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the FederalRepublic of Germany at 37-38 (cited in note
11).
36. Finn, Constitutionsin Crisisat 179 (cited in note 11) (quoting The FederalistNo.
1 at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1)).
37. The FederalistNo. 14 at 104 (James Madison) (cited in note 1).
38. I do not mean to overstate this point-for example, by implying that Americans
actively participated in the drafting of the German Basic Law, that the American influence upon it was the only influence, or that the German Basic Law (and the Constitutional Court's interpretation of it) do not carry some "American" ideas further than the
American Constitution, tradition, and practice have taken them. I simply mean to emphasize that the influence of American ideas upon the Basic Law was considerable, and
that the contrast between these two constitutional orders is not as great as Ackerman's
analysis suggests. Walter Murphy has written: "Not only did Britain, France, and the
United States set the basic guidelines for the new order [the German Basic Law], but
their military governors were also frequent, if seldom effective, kibitzers in the drafting
process." Murphy, Excluding PoliticalParties at 173 (cited in note 11). (He also has observed that the Japanese document was known for several decades as "the MacArthur
Constitution." Murphy, Constitutions,Constitutionalism,and Democracy at 22 n.27 (cited
in note 8).) For discussions of the impact of American ideas on the German Basic Law,
see, e.g., Peter H. Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (Oxford U. Press,
1963); John Ford Golay, The Founding of the FederalRepublic of Germany (U. of Chi.
Press, 1958).
39. See Murphy, 53 S.Cal. L. Rev. at 751-53 (cited in note 26). Nonetheless, there
are important differences between the American Constitution and the German Basic
Law, most notably with respect to the latter's provisions regarding duties and responsibilities in addition to rights. See Kommers, The ConstitutionalJurisprudenceof the Federal
Republic of Germany at 36-37, 41-42,56 (cited in note 11); Murphy, 53 S.Cal. L. Rev. at
753 (cited in note 26). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk- The Impoverishment of
Political Discourse 61-75 (The Free Press, 1991) (observing differences between the
American conception of the person as a "lone rights-bearer" and the German image of
the person as having not only rights but also responsibilities and duties to others); but see
Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility,43 Duke .,.989 (1994) (criticizing Glen-
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In conclusion, the fact that the American Constitution, unlike the German Basic Law, does not explicitly entrench unalienable rights or constitutive principles does not prove that it is
dualist, or "democratic first, rights-protecting second." Contrary
to Ackerman's claim, the absence of provisions entrenching fundamental rights in the American Constitution is not an "embarrassment" for rights foundationalists.40 To paraphrase the Ninth
Amendment: the entrenchment in the Constitution, of certain
compromises, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
unalienable rights retained by the people.41 Ackerman has failed
to establish his claim that our "American exceptionalism" consists in the fact that we have an alienable dualist Constitution.
III. OUR IMPERFECT DUALIST CONSTITUTION?
Ackerman further argues that the general availability of repeal of fundamental rights protected in the American Constitution is an "embarrassment" for rights foundationalists but not for
dualists.42 He contends that our Constitution, again unlike the
German Basic Law, is open to "morally disastrous" amendments
repealing fundamental rights.43 To test this contention, Ackerman conjures up two hypothetical Christianity amendments. The
first establishes Christianity as the state religion of the American
people, thereby repealing the fundamental right to liberty of conscience. The second forbids repeal of the first, thereby entrenching it and in effect repealing freedom of speech and dualist
democracy itself.44 Ackerman states that dualists would accept
these amendments as valid while rights foundationalists would
reject them as unconstitutional. Asserting that in America, unlike Germany, "almost all lawyers" would consider "absurd" or
"preposterous" the idea that an amendment to the Constitution
don's account of the relationship between rights and responsibilities in American
jurisprudence).

40. See Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub. Af. at 41-42 (cited in note 8) (quoting Ackerman,
99 Yale L. at 468, 469 (cited in note 13)) (arguing, contra Ackerman, that substantive
fundamental rights such as liberty of conscience, along with procedural democratic rights
like the right to vote, are constitutive of and inalienable in our constitutional democracy).
41. A caveat is in order here. I am drawing an analogy by paraphrasing the Ninth
Amendment, not offering an interpretation of that provision. The controversies surrounding the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, ed., 1 The Rights Retained by the People (George Mason
U. Press, 1989); Randy E. Barnett, ed., 2 The Rights Retained by the People (George
Mason U. Press, 1993); Symposium on Interpretingthe Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1 (Randy E. Barnett, ed., 1988).
42. Ackerman, We the People at 14 (cited in note 2).
43. Id. at 14-15.
44. Id. at 14-15 & 15-16 n.
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might be unconstitutional, Ackerman claims that dualism better
fits our constitutional order than does rights foundationalism.45
Having drawn this contrast through these two hypothetical
amendments, Ackerman goes on to confess that, as a citizen and
a political philosopher, he is a rights foundationalist who would
be proud to be a member of the generation that "finally redeem[ed] the promise of the Declaration of Independence by entrenching inalienable rights into our Constitution," including
liberty of conscience and freedom of speech.46 We should recall
that his earlier writings include Social Justice in the Liberal
State,4 7 a work of rights foundationalist political philosophy that
bears affinities to the liberal political philosophies of John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin, from whom he now wishes to distance
himself as a dualist constitutional theorist.48 Michael Klarman
has suggested that Ackerman's confession that he yearns to
move "beyond dualism" to a rights foundationalist constitutional
order evinces a "glaring contradiction" that undermines his commitment to popular sovereignty and raises the question "why one
should take seriously Ackerman's detailed exegesis of dualist
democracy."49
Whether or not he falls into contradiction, Ackerman is
straining mightily to prove his democratic and positivist mettle by
proclaiming that he would uphold the validity of these hypothetical amendments as a dualist constitutional theorist, though he
45. Id. at 15 & 15 n. Ackerman states: "I doubt, moreover, that one may find many
American lawyers who seriously disagree-even among those who presently wrap themselves up in foundationalist rhetoric." Id. at 14-15. He does, however, mention Walter
Murphy as "a constitutionalist who may have the courage of his foundationalist convictions." See Ackerman, 99 Yale LJ. at 470 n.28 (cited in note 13) (citing Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and the Limits on ConstitutionalChange, 32 Am. J.
Juris. 1 (1987)). For analyses of the German constitutional order and judicial practice in
this respect, see, e.g., Murphy, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 754-57 (cited in note 26) (discussing
The Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951)); Finn, Constitutionsin Crisisat 186 (cited in
note 11) (same). See also supra note 33 (citing arguments that the American Constitution
entrenches certain unalienable rights against repeal).
46. Ackerman, We the People at 321 (cited in note 2). See also id. at 16.
47. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 1980).
48. Ackerman, We the People at 11 (cited in note 2) (referring to John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515 (1980); Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (cited in note 27); and Dworkin, Law's Empire (cited in note 27)). But see id. at 30,
327-28 n.49 (noting that his own work in political philosophy builds on the liberal tradition that includes Rawls); Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J. Phil. 364 (1994)
(criticizing Rawls, Political Liberalism (cited in note 25), while also acknowledging similarities between Rawls's political philosophy and his own).
49. Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/ConstitutionalFiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759, 763-64 n.37
(1992). Ackerman presumably would contend that there is no "glaring contradiction" between being a dualist constitutional theorist and being a rights foundationalist political
philosopher. See Ackerman, We the People at 16, 319-22 (cited in note 2).
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would hold them "morally disastrous" as a rights foundationalist
political philosopher. With all the zeal of a born-again positivist
who has seen the errors of his rights foundationalist past, Ackerman kneels before the altar of Henry Monaghan's "Imperfect
Constitution,"50 striving to show that his constitutional theory
passes what Christopher Eisgruber has dubbed Monaghan's "no
pain, no claim" test.51 (Basically, the idea is that a constitutional
theory has no serious claim on our attention unless the theorist
putting it forward suffers some pain by acknowledging that the
Constitution does not secure everything that she or he would
protect in a perfect Constitution.52) Indeed, Ackerman does
more than confess his past as a rights foundationalist, for he also
admits his present temptation to move beyond dualism to rights
foundationalism and to entrench a new Bill of Rights against sub-

sequent amendment53 Yet he maintains that he does not succumb, proving his democratic and positivist virtue by unveiling
his imperfect dualist Constitution54
Through this argument for dualism from the two hypothetical Christianity amendments, Ackerman is attempting to deliver
a coup de grace against rights foundationalists of the sort that
would be made by Article V positivists like Robert Bork.55 Their
50. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 395
(1981).
51. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional
Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke W. 1, 7 (1993) (referring to
Monaghan, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (cited in note 50)). But liberal rights foundationalists
should not despair. On the evidence of Ackerman's We the People, they should rest assured that his constitutional theory will legitimate almost anything that they believe the
Constitution protects, although in the name of We the People, not unalienable fundamental rights. See also Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317
(1992).
52. For the idea of a "Constitution-perfecting" theory, as distinguished from a "process-perfecting" theory, see Fleming, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (cited in note 3) (advancing a
Constitution-perfecting theory of judicial review of ordinary lawmaking without taking up
the issue of judicial review of higher lawmaking). I mean "perfecting" in the sense of
interpreting the Constitution with integrity so as to render it as a coherent whole, not in
Monaghan's caricatured sense of "Our Perfect Constitution" as a perfect liberal utopia or
an "ideal object" of political morality. See Monaghan, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 356 (cited in
note 50). Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Constancy to an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 406-07
(1981) (distinguishing "weak-sense perfectionism" or "constitutional rationalism" from
"strong-sense perfectionism"). For the idea of amendments to the Constitution as responding to imperfection, see Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection
(Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 1995).
53. Ackerman, We the People at 16, 319-22 (cited in note 2). For the notion of
"temptation," see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:"The PoliticalSeduction of
the Law (The Free Press, 1990) ("The Tempting of America").
54. Ackerman, We the People at 15-16 (cited in note 2).
55. See Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica (cited in note 53). (For Bork's discussion of
Ackerman's theory, see id. at 214-16; for Ackerman's critique of Bork's theory, see Bruce
Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale LJ. 1419 (1990) (reviewing Bork,
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last move, in trying to place the American Constitution in the
camp of popular sovereignty rather than unalienable fundamental rights, would be to assert that under the amending procedures
of Article V, We the People have ultimate constitutional authority to "alter any feature of the [constitutional] document including its commitment to basic liberties and constitutional forms."56
Now, this type of move is to be expected from an Article V
positivist like Bork. But such a move is, to say the least, surprising coming from Ackerman. After all, he has spent the last decade developing a complex theory of amending the Constitution
outside Article V through structural amendments.57 Yet here we
find Ackerman talking like an Article V positivist with respect to
repealability and entrenchment. In this essay, I can only briefly
state three points in response.
The first point concerns Ackerman's evident strategy for
winning acceptance of his complex constitutional theory among
lawyers. He assumes that lawyers are low-level positivists who
would reject out of hand rights foundationalist theories that presuppose that unalienable rights or constitutive principles are implicitly entrenched in the constitutional order (outside Article
V), though not explicitly entrenched in the constitutional document (in Article V). Ackerman's tack is apparently to join such
positivist lawyers and then to try to enlist them-through an appeal to lawyerly criteria of fit with our constitutional document
and underlying constitutional order-on the side of dualism and
against rights foundationalism.58 The strategy is basically if you
can't beat the positivist lawyers, join them, and then hope that
they will join you. I mean to intimate shades of Suzanna Sherry's

supra)). For discussion of the sort of coup de grace to be expected from someone with
commitments like Bork's, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and
Community in Liberal Constitutionalism182 (Oxford U. Press, 1990) ("LiberalVirtues").
56. Macedo, Liberal Virtues at 182 (cited in note 55).
57. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 266-94 (cited in note 2); Bruce A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LU. 1013, 1051-57 (1984); Ackerman, 99 Yale
LU. at 486-515 (cited in note 13). Ackerman is not the only constitutional theorist who
rejects the exclusivity of Article V's formal amending procedures. See also Amar, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (cited in note 31); Amar, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (cited in note 33).
58. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 15, 15 n. (cited in note 2) (appealing to
what "almost all lawyers" would think was "absurd" or "preposterous"). In remarks at
the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, November 16, 1993, Ackerman made repeated recourse to "lawyerly criteria of fit," which he
linked to his concern in his writings for "the possibility of interpretation." See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People at 131-62 (cited in note 2); Ackerman, 93 Yale L. at 1070-72 (cited
in note 57); Ackerman, 99 Yale L.J. at 515-45 (cited in note 13).
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interpretation of Ackerman's dualism, in the guise of a liberal
originalism, as "the ghost of liberalism past."59
Strategically, Ackerman would be prudent to ponder the
great likelihood that positivist lawyers who would join him in rejecting rights foundationalist ideas of implicit entrenchment of
constitutive principles or unalienable rights outside Article V as
absurd or preposterous would also stand ready to join positivists
like Bork in rejecting as preposterous and absurd Ackerman's
own idea of amendment of the Constitution outside Article V.
That is, lawyers who are Article V positivists regarding entrenchment are also quite likely to be Article V positivists concerning
amendment. They are usually the sort of people who contend
that the words of Article V "mean what they say"60 or that the
whole point of Article V is to have a "clear rule of recognition
for constitutional change." 61 In short, such positivist lawyersAckerman's new-found allies-probably would use Article V as
a coup de grace against his own theory of structural amendments.
Ironically, notwithstanding Ackerman's attempt to portray himself as a positivist,62 the positivists are the persons who are least

likely to be persuaded by his theory.
My second point is that Ackerman himself, despite his best
efforts, does not sound like an Article V positivist when discussing the two hypothetical Christianity amendments. For example,
he does not say simply that the hypothetical amendment repealing liberty of conscience is valid, because it has been ratified
through Article V procedures. Instead, he concedes that it would
inaugurate a "deep transformation" of our Constitution: "on
more or less the same order, though of a very different kind," as
the transformations to new "regimes" within dualist democracy
achieved by the Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal
Democrats. 63 Nor does Ackerman say simply that the hypothetical amendment entrenching such a repeal is valid, because the
59. See Sherry, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 933-34 (1992) (cited in note 7) (suggesting that
Ackerman's "originalism" reveals "the sad state of American liberalism" and that
"[t]here is genuine pathos in seeing what was once the most optimistic and forward-looking of the American political philosophies reduced in this appeal to the authority of the
past"). See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1521-23 (1988)
(interpreting Ackerman's dualism as a form of authoritarianism); Cass R. Sunstein, The
PartialConstitution 370 n.21 (Harv. U. Press, 1993) (suggesting that Ackerman's theory is
formalist).
60. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990).
61. Klarman, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 766 (cited in note 49).
62. See supra text accompanying note 20.
63. Ackerman, We the People at 14 (cited in note 2). For Ackerman's argument for
a "regime perspective," or for conceiving our constitutional history in terms of three re-
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voice of the People has duly spoken. Rather, he states that it
would amount to a "repeal of dualist democracy itself."64 That is,
the latter amendment would go beyond the former's deep transformation within dualist democracy to a repeal of that order. It
might amount to a constitutional breakdown or revolution, ushering in a new constitutional order altogether.65
The implication is that Ackerman himself acknowledges that
principles such as liberty of conscience and freedom of speech,
even if they are not explicitly entrenched in our constitutional
document, are nonetheless fundamental rights that partly constitute the identity of regimes within our constitutional order or of
that order itself. Indeed, on Ackerman's account, freedom of
speech, at least as expressed in participation in the amending
process, might be unalienable.66 My claim is not that Ackerman
here commits himself to a theory that the Constitution implicitly
entrenches constitutive principles or fundamental rights outside
Article V-only that his theory is not as far from such a conception as might appear on first sight.
This suggestion brings me to the third point: Just as Ackerman has elaborated a theory of "structural amendments" to the
Constitution outside the formal Article V amending procedures,67 so one might develop a theory of "structural entrenchments" of fundamental rights or constitutive principles outside
Article V. Ackerman rejects rights foundationalist theories that
hold that certain fundamental rights are pre-constitutional principles that bind even constitutional framers and ratifiers at the
gimes or republics (those inaugurated by the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New
Deal), see id. at 58-67.
64. Id. at 15-16 n. Ackerman's implicit distinction between "deep transformations"
within dualist democracy and a "repeal of dualist democracy itself" bears a resemblance
to Murphy's distinction between amending a constitutional order (correcting, adjusting,
or modifying it) and repudiating it (destroying it and creating another one). See, e.g.,
Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism,and Democracy at 14 (cited in note 8); Murphy,
53 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 757 (cited in note 26). The Supreme Court of California, drawing a
distinction between "amendment" and "revision," struck down a state constitutional
amendment, adopted by referendum, that would have required state judges, when interpreting the state constitution, to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretations
of similarly worded clauses in the national constitutional document. See Murphy, Merlin's Memory (cited in note 26) (discussing Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal.
1990)). The Court reasoned that such a change "would so fundamentally transform California's status as a member of a federal union as to effect a constitutional revision; and
the [constitutional] text provided that 'revisions' could be accomplished only by special
conventions." Id.
65. See infra text accompanying note 71.
66. See Ackerman, We the People at 15-16 n. (cited in note 2); see also supra note 33
(citing arguments that the American Constitution entrenches certain unalienable rights
against repeal).
67. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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founding, when they are establishing a constitutional order.68
Whatever one thinks of such theories, one might advance a theory that certain constitutive principles or fundamental rights become entrenched against repeal through long and successful
constitutional tradition and practice.69 Responding to Ackerman's hypothetical Christianity amendments along these lines,
Rawls suggests that our constitutional tradition and practice over
two centuries place restrictions upon the formal amending procedures of Article V.70 On this view, Ackerman's hypotheticals,
instead of being valid amendments of the Constitution, would
amount to a constitutional breakdown, or revolution in the
proper sense.71 Moreover, this view entails that entrenchment is
not purely positivist and confined to Article V (any more than
amendment is for Ackerman's theory).72
The possibility of a theory of this sort underscores an evident incongruity in Ackerman's theory: Ackerman supplements
Article V where structural amendments are concerned but would
invoke Article V as a positivist bar to structural entrenchments
of fundamental rights at the founding or through constitutional
tradition and practice.73 I do not claim that a theory of structural
entrenchments would permanently fix basic constitutional guarantees, or perpetually impose pre-constitutional principles upon
We the People. In fact, structurally entrenched fundamental
rights or constitutive principles, like explicitly entrenched ones,
will give way to a strong majority that is determined to make the
Constitution conform to its political will. But again, this is simply
a fact about political power as such,74 not a fact that unveils an
ultimate rule of recognition or source of legitimacy in popular
68. See Ackerman, We the People at 11-13 (cited in note 2). For the idea of "preconstitutional principles" that bind even framers and ratifiers, see Finn, Constitutions in
Crisis at 7, 186, 188 (cited in note 11).
69. Let us say "moderately successful," so as not to seem Panglossian about our
constitutional tradition and practice, which have been marred by many injustices.
70. Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism at 238-39 (cited in note 25). See also Macedo, Lib-

eral Virtues at 182-83 (cited in note 55).
71. Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism at 239 (cited in note 25); Freeman, 21 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. at 41-42 (cited in note 8).
72. For arguments that neither amendment nor entrenchment is purely positivist
and confined to the formal procedures of Article V, see, e.g., Amar, 94 Colum. L. Rev.
457 (cited in note 33); Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (cited in note 31).
73. Ackerman presumably would deny that there is any real incongruity in this respect. He might advance a ratchet theory concerning We the People, contending that it is
one thing to expand popular sovereignty through a theory of amending the Constitution
outside Article V, but quite another to contract it through a theory of entrenching the
Constitution outside Article V.
74. See Rawls, Political Liberalism at 233 (cited in note 25) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 25-26).

19941

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

sovereignty in an imperfect American Constitution as distinguished from the (perhaps) more perfect German Basic Law.
The question what is the Constitution-andwhen does it become a different Constitution through breakdown or revolution-is analytically distinct from the question whether courts are
empowered to declare amendments (or original provisions) unconstitutional.75 And so, even if we decide to reject Ackerman's
Article V positivism concerning entrenchment of constitutive
principles or fundamental rights in the Constitution, there remains his contrast between American and German judicial practices. He asserts that in America, judicial review invalidating
"morally disastrous" amendments would seem "absurd" or "preposterous" to "almost all lawyers," whereas in Germany it would
not.76 From this contrast, Ackerman argues that our scheme of
government is dualist, while the German scheme is rights
foundationalist.
Ackerman overstates the significance of this contrast. Initially, one might express doubts whether hypotheticals concerning judicial review of unconstitutional amendments to our
Constitution provide a good crucible in which to test whether almost all lawyers are dualists or rights foundationalists. After all,
most American lawyers probably have never thought about the
possibility of limitations on the amending power and, if asked
about it, probably would simply make the immediate observation
that the idea of an "unconstitutional constitutional amendment"
seems like a contradiction in terms or a paradox. But this idea
seems so only to those who beg the question by unreflectively
assuming a false equivalence among the amending power, the
Constitution, and the constituent power.77 If pressed beyond this
75. For the distinction between theory of the Constitution and theory of judicial
review (and between the interrogatives what is the Constitution and who may authoritatively interpret it), see, e.g., Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, American ConstitutionalInterpretation 9-12 (cited in note 8); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the ConstitutionMeans 19699 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1984); Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitutionof JudicialPower
40-43 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1993). See also Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalFaith 953 (Princeton U. Press, 1988).
76. See Ackerman, We the People at 15, 15 n. (cited in note 2). See also supra text
accompanying note 45. In referring to German judicial practice, Ackerman cites no cases
but presumably is alluding to cases like The Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951), and
Privacy of Communications Case, 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970). These two cases are edited and
translated in Murphy and Tanenhaus, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw at 208-12, 659-66
(cited in note 11). Murphy has observed that the Supreme Court in India has voided
amendments, as has the Supreme Court of California. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy at 11 & 23 nn.39-40 (cited in note 8).
77. I cannot pursue these complex matters here. For sophisticated discussions of
such issues, see, e.g., Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 164-204 (cited in note 17);
Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 199-202 (cited in note 75); Hart, The Concept
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immediate reaction, almost all lawyers might also believe that to
adopt amendments purporting to repeal certain unalienable fundamental rights (such as freedom of speech and liberty of conscience) would be to repudiate our constitutional order, not
merely to ratify a valid constitutional amendment.78
In any event, in assessing Ackerman's account of American
judicial practice, we should distinguish between two types of situations in which an assertion regarding judicial review might be
dismissed as absurd or preposterous. In the first, judicial review
would seem absurd because it is unprecedented (or novel). In
the second, it would seem absurd because it is contrary to well
established precedents (or settled). To illustrate the first situation: in 1946, Justice Frankfurter might have said that representation-reinforcing judicial review of malapportioned legislatures
would be absurd;79 or in 1922, a country lawyer named Hugo
Black might have lamented that "absolutist" judicial review enforcing the First Amendment against both the state and federal
governments would be absurd;80 or again, in 1937, Ackerman's
forebears might have despaired that President Franklin
Roosevelt was launching a court-packing plan instead of seizing a
crucial moment to amend the Constitution through the formal
procedures of Article V, because the idea of structural amendments to the Constitution outside Article V would be preposterous.8 1 To illustrate the second situation: today, one might argue,
despite Richard Epstein, that judicial review invalidating the
New Deal and the welfare state that has grown up on its foundations would be absurd.82
Which of these two types of situations does Ackerman mean
to invoke in claiming that in America judicial review declaring
amendments unconstitutional would seem absurd or preposterof Law at 144-50 (cited in note 18); H.L.A. Hart, Self-referring Laws, in H.L.A. Hart,
Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy 170 (cited in note 34).
78. For a distinction between amending a constitutional order and repudiating it, see
supra note 64.
79. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (arguing that courts ought to
stay out of that "political thicket"). By "representation-reinforcing" judicial review, I
refer to the type of theory epitomized by John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of JudicialReview (Harv. U. Press, 1980) ("Democracy and Distrust").
80. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of
Livelihood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1103, 1116 (1986).
81. For Ackerman's discussion of FDR's choices between launching a court-packing
plan and fighting for constitutional amendments through the formal procedures of Article
V, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, Chapter 14 ("Court-Packing
and Its Aftermath") (Fall 1993 draft, presented at New York University School of Law
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, Nov. 16, 1993).
82. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985).
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ous to almost all lawyers? Evidently the first rather than the second. Ackerman does not appear to argue that in America there
is a well established practice against judicial review of amendments to assure conformity with constitutive principles, only that

there is no well established practice in favor of such review.83 To
be sure, there are cases rejecting the idea that a duly ratified
amendment might be unconstitutional (which Ackerman does
not cite).84 But those cases were easy. For example, one basically upheld the Eighteenth Amendment against an argument
that it was beyond the Article V amending power to prohibit the
manufacture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation
of intoxicating liquors for beverage purp6ses. 85 Another essentially upheld the Nineteenth Amendment against a contention
that it deprived unconsenting states of their sovereign power to
deny women the right to vote and thereby destroyed their autonomy as political bodies.86 Furthermore, such cases date from an
era-1920 and 1922, respectively-in which "representation-

reinforcing" review of ordinary lawmaking might have seemed
hardly less absurd than "sovereignty-reinforcing"

review pf

higher lawmaking.87 I mention these complex matters not to re-solve them but rather to suggest that our practices regarding judicial review may not be as settled as Ackerman's argument
presumes.

Put another way, the question whether the Supreme Court
has authority to declare amendments (or original provisions) unconstitutional presents a case of what Hart would call uncertainty
in the penumbra of the ultimate rules of recognition.88 In resolv83. Indeed, Ackerman rejects a common interpretation of Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939), which some scholars read as precluding judicial review of the amending
process on the ground that such matters are nonjusticiable political questions. See Ackerman, 99 Yale LJ. at 492-99 (cited in note 13). He argues that Coleman expressly repudiates the formalist view that "all constitutional change must be governed in strict accord
with the rules of Article Five." Id. at 492.
84. The cases are discussed in Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 187-201
(cited in note 17).
85. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920). See also United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
86. Leser v. Garnett,258 U.S. 130 (1922).
87. For the idea of "sovereignty-reinforcing" judicial review of amendments to the
Constitution, by analogy to Ely's notion of "representation-reinforcing" judicial review of
legislation and administration, see Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 195 (cited in
note 17) (referring to Ely, Democracy and Distrust (cited in note 79)). I am aware that
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938),
cites precedents from the 1920's (and 1930's) for what ,we now would call "representationreinforcing" judicial review. But it took Justice Stone's footnote to pull together and
systematize these precedents into the intimations of such an approach, and only later
were these precedents fully comprehended as applying (or anticipating) it.
88. See Hart, The Concept of Law at 144-50 (cited in note 18).
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ing such questions, as Hart aptly put it: "Here all that succeeds is
success.... Here power acquires authority ex post facto from
success."89

In this light, the glaring difficulty with the idea of judicial
review preserving the constitutive principles or fundamental
rights of our Constitution against repeal is not so much absurdity
or preposterousness as it is probable futility. We all know the
standard moves concerning the impotence of the "least dangerous branch": for example, quotations from The Federalist No.
78,90 President Andrew Jackson,91 James Bradley Thayer,92 Judge
Learned Hand,93 and John Hart Ely.94 Yet we all also know the
common countermoves: for example, hypotheticals about the
possibility of judicial civil disobedience95 and the observation
that, our fears of futility notwithstanding, after ordered to do so

89. Id. at 149, 150.
90. In describing the judiciary as the branch of government that is "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution," Alexander Hamilton wrote: "It may truly
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." The
FederalistNo. 78 at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (cited in note 1).
91. In response to Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in which the
Supreme Court per Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's anti-Cherokee laws were
unconstitutional, President Jackson supposedly said: "Well, John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it!" Edward S. Corwin, The President:Office and Powers 64
(New York U. Press, 4th ed., 1957). This legend, however, has been disputed. Id. at 35051 n.61.
92. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129,156 (1893) ("Under no system can the power of courts go
far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere"). For a new interpre.
tation of this passage from Thayer, see Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: JudicialReview or
Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 9 (1993).
93. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in Irving Dilliard ed., The Spirit of Liberty
189, 190 (Alfred A. Knopf, 3d ed., 1960) ("Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it .... while it lies there it
needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it").
94. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 107 (cited in note 79) ("courts will tend to be
swept along by the same sorts of fears" that moved legislatures, executives, and, for that
matter, citizens). The fear of "futility" thesis often goes hand in hand with the fear of
"destruction" thesis. See id. at 47-48. For another contemporary version of the "futility"
thesis, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (U. of Chi. Press, 1991).
95. Any calls for judicial civil disobedience must come to terms with the fact that
abolitionist judges yielded to unjust positive laws supporting slavery. See Robert Cover,
Justice Accused. Antislavery and the JudicialProcess(Yale U. Press, 1975); Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers,Times (London) Literary Supplement, Dec. 5,1975, at
1437 (reviewing Cover, supra). See also Barber, On What the Constitution Means 199-202
(cited in note 75); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism'sForgottenPast, 10
Const. Comm. 37 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Note, Justice Story, Slavery, and the
NaturalLaw Foundations of American Constitutionalism,55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 273 (1988).
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in United States v. Nixon,96 President Richard Nixon did turn
over those tapes. 97
To Ackerman's dualist claims about the absurdity or preposterousness of judicial review of morally disastrous amendments,
and to fears about its futility, I offer three responses. The first is
to repeat what Hart said concerning such situations: "Here all
that succeeds is success."98 The second is to imagine what Yogi
Berra, paraphrasing Hart, might have said: "Here nothing succeeds like failure." By that paradoxical utterance, I mean to suggest the possibility that judicial review (or judicial civil
disobedience) invalidating repeals of liberty of conscience and
freedom of speech-whether successful or futile in a narrow
legal sense-would succeed in dramatically signaling that a constitutional breakdown or revolution was occurring.99

My final response is to admit that-from a larger perspective outside our constitutional enterprise-constitutions, constitutional interpretation, and judicial review are themselves
preposterous and absurd. As William F. Harris expresses it:
"American constitutional interpretation takes for granted the elemental preposterousness of its subject-the presumption that a
political world can be constructed and controlled with words."100
And, in the face of a determined political will, constitutionswritten or unwritten, with or without entrenchment clausesmay be "absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a
power in its own nature illimitable."O1 We should not, however,
adopt such an external point of view in assessing the foundations
of legitimacy in our constitutional order.102 Our Constitution is
96. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
97.

See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam

and Its Aftermath 56 (Princeton U. Press, 1993). Ely also states: "That the president will
disobey an order of the Supreme Court seems less likely in 1993 than it might have 100
years ago." Id. Our long and moderately successful constitutional tradition and practice

are what makes it seem less likely today. See supra text accompanying note 69.
98. Hart, The Concept of Law at 149 (cited in note 18).
99. Cf. Ackerman, We the People at 272-80 (cited in note 2) (discussing signaling
concerning higher lawmaking in constitutional moments).
100. Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 1 (cited in note 17). Harris explains
that he means the word "preposterousness" in "both its original and derived senses: (a)
inverted in time, the 'later' coming before, and the 'before' coming later, and (b) 'contrary to nature, reason, or common sense.'" Id. at 1 n.1.
101. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (discussed supra text
accompanying note 24).
102. I mean to echo Hart's notion of an "external" versus an "internal" point of view
toward a legal system. See, e.g., Hart, The Concept of Law 86-88, 99-100, 112, 114 (cited
in note 18).
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underwritten by more than the fact of political power lying under
an imperfect dualist Constitution.103
IV. WE THE EXCEPTIONAL AMERICAN PEOPLE?
The bicentennial celebration of the ratification of the Bill of
Rights is over. James Madison rightly proclaimed in The Federalist No. 14: "[The People of America] reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe."104 Two
centuries later, though, these fabrics of governments have served
as models for other countries (and will continue to do so if efforts
like Ackerman's project of American imperialism, or exporting
liberal revolution to the countries of Eastern Europe, make any
headway).105 Ironically, the upshot of Ackerman's project of
"American exceptionalism" is that on his view We the People,
the American popular sovereign, are ultimately quite similar to
the "legally untrammelled will" of the sovereign that is envisioned in British legal positivism and that positivist dualists
would find standing behind the entrenchment clauses of the purportedly rights foundationalist German Basic Law.106 The
American constitutional order may well be exceptional, but Ackerman has not established his case for dualism over rights
foundationalism as the better account of the American scheme of
government through his contrast between the American Constitution and the German Basic Law.

103.

See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.

104. The FederalistNo. 14 at 104 (James Madison) (cited in note 1).
105.

See Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (cited in note 5). Ackerman

also considers "the meaning of 1989" and the revolutions of Eastern Europe for South
Africa and Latin America, not to mention the United States. Id. at 113-23.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.

